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A major application of quantum communication is the distribution of entangled particles for use in
quantum key distribution (QKD). Due to noise in the communication line, QKD is in practice limited
to a distance of a few hundred kilometres, and can only be extended to longer distances by use of
a quantum repeater, a device which performs entanglement distillation and quantum teleportation.
The existence of noisy entangled states that are undistillable but nevertheless useful for QKD raises
the question of the feasibility of a quantum key repeater, which would work beyond the limits of
entanglement distillation, hence possibly tolerating higher noise levels than existing protocols. Here
we exhibit fundamental limits on such a device in the form of bounds on the rate at which it may
extract secure key. As a consequence, we give examples of states suitable for QKD but unsuitable
for the most general quantum key repeater protocol.
When a signal is passed from a sender to a receiver, it inevitably degrades due to the noise present in
any realistic communication channel (for example a cable or free space). The degradation of the signal is
typically exponential in the length of the communication line. When the signal is classical, degradation can
be counteracted by use of an amplifier that measures the degraded signal and, depending on a threshold,
replaces it by a stronger signal. When the signal is quantum mechanical (for example encoded in non-
orthogonal polarisations of a single photon), such an amplifier cannot work any more, since the measure-
ment inevitably disturbs the signal [1], and, more generally, since quantum mechanical signals cannot be
cloned [2]. Sending a quantum signal, however, is the basis of quantum key distribution (QKD), a method to
distribute a cryptographic key which can later be used for perfectly secure communication between sender
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FIG. 1: Quantum repeater: a) Alice and Charlie – and similarly Charlie and Bob – distil EPR pairs from noisy states
(grey). b) Charlie uses the EPR pairs (green) he shares with Bob to teleport his part of the states he shares with Alice
to Bob. c) Alice and Bob share EPR pairs.
and receiver [3]. The degradation of sent quantum signals therefore seems to place a fundamental limit
on the distance at which secure communication is possible thereby severely limiting its applicability in the
internet [4–6].
A way around this limitation is the use of entanglement-based quantum key distribution schemes [7, 8]
in conjunction with a so-called quantum repeater [9, 10]. This amounts to distributing n Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs between Alice and Charlie (an untrusted telecom provider) and between Bob and Charlie.
Imperfections due to noise in the transmission are compensated by distillation, yielding ≈ ED × n perfect
EPR pairs. Here ED denotes the distillable entanglement of the imperfect EPR pair, that is the optimal rate
at which perfect EPR pairs can be distilled from imperfect ones. The EPR pairs between Charlie and Bob
are then used to teleport the state of Charlie’s other particles to Bob. This process, known as entanglement
swapping, results in EPR pairs between Alice and Bob [11] (see Fig. 1). When Alice and Bob make
appropriate measurements on these EPR pairs, they obtain a sequence of secret key bits, that is, an identical
but random sequence of bits that is uncorrelated with the rest of the universe (including Charlie’s systems),
enabling secure communication. The described scheme with one intermediate station effectively doubles the
distance over which QKD can be carried out. This abstract view of the quantum repeater will be sufficient
for our purpose. The full proposal of a quantum repeater in fact allows to efficiently extend the distance
arbitrarily even if the local operations are subject to a limited amount of noise [9]. The implementation of
quantum repeaters is therefore one of the focal points of experimental quantum information science [10].
Due to the tight connection between the distillation of EPR pairs and QKD [12, 13], it came as a surprise
that there are bound entangled states (that is entangled states with vanishing distillable entanglement) from
3which secret key can be obtained [1]. With the help of a quantum repeater as described above, however, the
secret key contained in such states cannot be extended to larger distances, as the states do not allow for the
distillation of EPR pairs. This raises the question of whether there may be other ways to extend the secret
key to arbitrary distances than by entanglement distillation and swapping, other quantum key repeaters.
In this work, we introduce and formally define the concept of a quantum key repeater. We then study
the associated quantum key repeater rate. It is always at least as large as the rate that can be obtained in a
quantum repeater protocol and we raise the question whether it could be larger (and in particular non-zero
for bound entangled states). Our main results consist of upper bounds on this quantity which we use to
show that there are quantum states with extreme behaviour: state with a large key rate but with a negligible
quantum key repeater rate. We thus demonstrate fundamental limitations on quantum key repeaters.
Results
The Quantum Key Repeater Rate
We analyse the quantum key repeater rate KA↔C↔B at which a protocol — only using local operations
and classical communication (LOCC) — is able to extract private bits between Alice and Bob from entan-
gled states which each of them shares with Charlie (see Fig. 2). See Supplementary Note 1 for a formal
definition of the key repeater rate. By a private bit we mean an entangled state containing a unit of privacy
paralleling the EPR pair as a unit of entanglement [1, 5]. Mathematically, private bits are entangled states
of the form
γAA’BB’ =
1
2

√
XX† 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0
√
X†X
 , (1)
where A and B are qubits that contain the key bits, corresponding to the rows and columns in the matrix.
The AB subsystem is called the key part. A’ and B’ are each a d-dimensional systems, forming the so-called
shield part. X is a d2-by-d2 matrix with ‖X‖1 = 1 (see also Fig. 3). γAA’BB’ can also be presented in the
form U |Ψ〉〈Ψ|AB ⊗ σA’B’U †, where σA’B’ is some state, |Ψ〉 = 1√2 |00 + 11〉 and U = |00〉〈00|AB ⊗ U0 +
|11〉〈11|AB ⊗ U1 is a controlled unitary acting on σA’B’. This operation is called twisting. It is now easy
to see that the bit that Alice and Bob obtain when they measure A and B in the computation basis is a key
bit, that is, it is random and secure, that is product with a purification of γ held by the eavesdropper. The
relation between X and σ is given by X = U0σA’B’U
†
1 .
Note that just as the definition of the distillable key [1, 15], the definition of the quantum key repeater rate
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FIG. 2: Quantum key repeater: a) Multiple copies of noisy states ρ and ρ˜, shared by Alice and Charlie and by Charlie
and Bob, respectively, are transformed by means of LOCC into b) a private state γ (green-yellow) between Alice and
Bob.
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FIG. 3: The private state γAA’BB’. a) Bipartite state with four subsystems A,A’,B and B’. The subsystems AB form
the ”key part” (green) which, due to the ”shield part” A’B’ (yellow), is secure against an eavesdropper. b) Icon of a
private bit.
is information-theoretic in nature. The role of Charlie here merits special attention. While he participates
in the LOCC protocol like Alice and Bob do, he is not a “trusted party”; indeed, at the end of the protocol,
Alice and Bob wish to obtain private bits, whose privacy is not compromised even if at that point Charlie
passes all his remaining information to the eavesdropper. We also note that well-known techniques from
quantum information theory [17, 18] allow to conclude that the obtained rate of private bits can be made
unconditionally secure [19–21]. In the following we will describe our main results which demonstrate that
the performance of quantum key repeaters beyond the use of entanglement distillation is severely limited.
Some private states cannot be swapped
5Our first result takes as its starting point the observation that there are private bits that are almost indis-
tinguishable from separable states by LOCC [2]. To see this, consider the state
γ˜AA’BB’ =
1
2

√
XX† 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
√
X†X
 , (2)
which is obtained from γ, when Alice and Bob measure the key part of their state in the computational
basis. An example is given by the choice X = 1
d
√
d
∑
ij uij |i〉〈j| ⊗ |j〉〈i|, where the uij are the entries in
the quantum Fourier transform in dimension d. For this choice of X , γ˜ is separable. The distinguishability
under LOCC operations is measured in the norm ‖γ − γ˜‖LOCC, which is bounded by the distinguishability
under global maps preserving the positivity under the partial transpose ‖γ− γ˜‖PPT [23]. This can further be
bounded by ‖γΓ − γ˜Γ‖1, which is easily calculated as ‖XΓ‖1 = 1√d+1 . Γ indicates the partial transpose,
that is, the transpose of one of the systems [14].
Suppose now that a quantum repeater protocol applied to two copies of the latter state, shared by Alice
and Charlie and Bob and Charlie respectively, successfully outputs a private bit between Alice and Bob.
This could be regarded as the privacy analogue to entanglement swapping. Then, if Alice and Bob joined
their labs, they could distinguish this resulting state from a separable state, as separable states are well
distinguishable from private states by a global measurement [1]. This implies an LOCC procedure for Alice
& Bob (jointly) and Charlie to distinguish the initial private bits γ ⊗ γ from separable states: first run the
quantum key repeater protocol and then perform the measurement. This, however, is in contradiction to
the property that the private state γ (and hence γ ⊗ γ) is almost indistinguishable from separable states
under LOCC. In conclusion this shows that such private bits cannot be successfully extended to a private bit
between Alice and Bob by any LOCC protocol acting on single copies (see Supplementary Note 2).
Bounding the Quantum Key Repeater Rate
Although intuitive, the above argument only bounds the repeated key obtained from a single copy of
input states. The language of entanglement measures allows us to formulate this argument asymptotically
as a rigorous distinguishability bound on the rate KA↔C↔B for general states ρ and ρ˜:
KA↔C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤ D∞C↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB), (3)
where the right hand side is the regularised LOCC-restricted relative entropy distance to the closest sepa-
rable state [7]: D∞(ρ) = limn7→∞ 1nD(ρ
⊗n), where D(ρ) = infσ supM D(M(ρ)||M(σ)) with the min-
imisation over separable states σ, the maximisation over LOCC implementable measurements and D the
relative entropy distance. The proof is given in Supplementary Note 3.
6Arguably, it is difficult if not impossible to compute this expression. But noting that this bound is
invariant under partial transposition of the C system, we can easily upper bound the quantity for all known
bound entangled states (these are the ones with positive partial transpose) in terms of the relative entropy of
entanglement of the partially transposed state ρΓ: E∞R (ρ
Γ)+E∞R (ρ˜
Γ). The relative entropy of entanglement
is given byER(ρ) = minσD(ρ||σ) where the minimisation extends over separable states; the regularisation
is analogous to the one above. If we restrict to forward communication from Charlie and ρACA = ρ˜CBB, the
squashed entanglement measure provides a bound: KA←C→B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤ 4Esq(ρΓ). The squashed
entanglement is given as (one half times) the minimal conditional mutual information when minimising
over all extensions of the state (we condition on the extending system). Using invariance under partial
transposition directly on the hypothetical quantum key repeater protocol, we obtain for PPT states ρ and ρ˜:
KA↔C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤ KD(ρΓACA) ≤ min{E∞R (ρΓACA), Esq(ρΓACA)}, (4)
where KD is the key rate, that is, the rate at which secret key can be extracted from ρ by LOCC. The same
holds for ρ˜ΓCBB. The proof can be found in Supplementary Note 4.
We will now give an example of a state ρACA = ρ˜CBB for which the key rate is large, but the bounds,
hence the quantum key repeater rate, are arbitrarily small. Guided by our intuition, we would like to consider
the private bit γ from above whose partial transpose is close to a separable state. The state, however, is not
PPT, as no private bit can be PPT [1]. Fortunately, it turns into a PPT state ρ under mixing with a small
amount of noise and we find KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ) ≈ 0 while KD(ρ) ≈ 1. This leads us to the main conclusion
of our paper: there exist entangled quantum states that are useful for quantum key distribution at small
distances but that are virtually useless for long-distance quantum key distribution (see Fig. 4).
Bounding the Entanglement of the Output
Finally, we present a different type of bound on the quantum key repeater rate based on the direct analysis
of the entanglement of a concrete output state of a quantum repeater protocol:
KA←C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤
1
2
EC(ρACA) +
1
2
ED(ρ˜CBB), (5)
where EC denotes the entanglement cost of the state, the rate of EPR states needed to create many copies
of the state. This bound, unlike the ones presented above, applies to all quantum states. In particular, it
applies to certain states invariant under partial transposition which escape the techniques presented before.
Note that in the case of PPT states, one may partially transpose the states appearing on the right hand side
since KA←C↔B is invariant under partial transposition. The proof of (5) is obtained by upper bounding the
squashed entanglement of the output state of the protocol using a manipulation of entropies resulting in the
right hand side of (5). The squashed entanglement in turn upper bounds the distillable key of the output
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FIG. 4: Limitation on quantum key repeaters: Despite Alice and Charlie as well as Charlie and Bob sharing almost
n bits of secure key, there is no LOCC protocol between Alice, Charlie and Bob, which results in a non-negligible
amount of secure key between Alice and Bob.
state (which upper bounds the left hand side) [10]. For a detailed proof see Supplementary Note 5. There,
we also exhibit a private bit with a significant drop in the repeater rate when compared to the key rate. We
further investigate the tightness of the bound (5) and, based on a random construction, show that the left
hand side cannot be replaced by the entanglement cost of the output state.
Discussion
The preceding results pose limitations on the entanglement of the output state of a quantum key repeater
protocol. As such, they support the PPT-squared conjecture: Assume that Alice and Charlie share a PPT
state and that Bob and Charlie share a PPT state; then the state of Alice and Bob, conditioned on any mea-
surement by Charlie, is always separable [27–29]. Reaching even further, and consistent with our findings,
we may speculate that perhaps the only “transitive” entanglement in quantum states, that is entanglement
that survives a quantum key repeater, is the distillable entanglement. One may also wonder whether apart
from (5) there are other inequalities between entanglement measures of the in- and output states. In the
context of algebro-geometric measures, this question has been raised and relations for the concurrence have
8been found [30, 31]. Our work focuses on operational entanglement measures.
States from which more key than entanglement can be extracted have recently been demonstrated exper-
imentally in a quantum optical setup [32]. These are exactly the private states discussed in Supplementary
Note 2 (X is the SWAP operator) with shield dimension equal to two. As our results for these states only
become effective for higher shield dimensions, we cannot conclude that the single copy key repeater drops
when compared to the key contained in these states. This may be overcome by stronger theoretical bounds or
experimental progress which increases the shield dimension; we expect both improvements to be achieved
in the near future.
With this paper we initiate the study of long-distance quantum communication and cryptography be-
yond the use of entanglement distillation by the introduction of the concept of a quantum key repeater.
Even though the reported results provide limitations rather than new possibilities, we hope that this work
will lead to a rethinking of the currently used protocols resulting in procedures for long-distance quantum
communication that are both more efficient and that can operate in noisier environments. In the following
we will give a simple example of such a rethinking: Assume that Alice and Charlie share a private bit γACA
which is almost PPT and thus requires a large shield system (see Supplementary Note 6). The quantum
repeater based on quantum teleportation would thus require Bob and Charlie to share a large amount of
EPR pairs in order to teleport Charlie’s share of γACA to Bob. Alice and Bob can then extract one bit of
secret key by measuring the state. Inspired by the work of Smith and Yard [33], we show in Supplementary
Note 6 that a single EPR pair and a particular state ρCBB which is so noisy that it contains no (one-way)
distillable entanglement are sufficient in order to obtain a large quantum key repeater rate (using only one-
way communication from Alice and Charlie to Bob). We thus showed that there are situations in which
significant amounts of distillable entanglement may be replaced by (one-way) undistillable states.
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Supplementary Note 1
Definitions
Here we first formally recall the definition of a private state, of the secret key rate and of the distillable
entanglement. We will then introduce the distillation of secure key with an intermediate station and formally
introduce the corresponding information theoretic rate of secure key. A private state can be constructed
from a maximally entangled state |Ψ2m〉AB =
∑2m−1
i=0 |ii〉 = |Ψ〉⊗m by tensoring with some state σA′B′
and performing a so-called “twisting“ operation. A twisting operation is a controlled unitary of the form
U twist =
∑
ij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ U (ij)A′B′ that spreads the entanglement over the enlarged Hilbert space. Formally
γm = U
twist
(
|Ψ(2m)〉〈Ψ(2m)|AB ⊗ σA′B′
)
U twist
†
(6)
=
1
2m
2m−1∑
ij=0
|ii〉〈jj|AB ⊗ U (ii)σA′B′U (jj)†, (7)
where we emphasize that m is the number of key bits, in contrast to some of the literature, where the
subscript denotes the dimension of the key system. It has been shown that even if Eve is in possession of
the entire purification of γm, Alice and Bob will still be able to obtain m bits of perfect key by measuring
the AB subsystem in the computational basis, while keeping the A′B′ part away from Eve. As all the
correlation the key has with the outside world is contained in A′B′, it is called the “shield part“, whereas
AB is called the “key part“. For m = 1, γ1 is also called a “private bit“ or “p-bit“ which can alternatively
be represented in the form
γAA
′BB′
1 =
1
2

√
XX† 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0
√
X†X
 , (8)
where A and B are qubits that contain the key bits, corresponding to the rows and columns in the matrix.
A′ and B′ are each d-dimensional systems, called the shield. X is a d2-by-d2 matrix with ‖X‖1 = 1.
As the twisting operations can be non-local, not every private state can be obtained from a single rank 2m
maximally entangled state via LOCC. This shows that privacy is a truly different property of a quantum
state than its distillable entanglement, motivating the introduction of a quantity known as “distillable key“
[1]
KD(ρ) = inf
>0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
Λn LOCC,γm
{m
n
: Λn(ρ
⊗n) ≈ γm
}
, (9)
13
in analogy to the distillable entanglement
ED(ρ) = inf
>0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
Λn LOCC
{m
n
: Λn(ρ
⊗n) ≈ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|⊗m
}
. (10)
With α ≈ β we mean ‖α − β‖1 ≤ . Clearly KD(γm) ≥ m. As every rank 2m-dimensional maximally
entangled state is a private state, KD ≥ ED. In order to study the question of quantum key repeaters,
we introduce the following quantity. For input states ρACA between Alice and Charlie and ρ˜CBB between
Charlie and Bob we call
KA↔C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) = inf>0 lim supn→∞ supΛnLOCC,γm
{m
n
: TrCΛn
(
(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)⊗n
) ≈ γm} (11)
the quantum key repeater rate of ρ and ρ˜ with respect to arbitrary LOCC operations among Alice, Bob and
Charlie. If we restrict the protocols to one-way communication from Charlie to Alice we write KA←C↔B
and if all communication is one-way from Charlie we write KA←C→B .
14
Supplementary Note 2
Trace Norm Bound
The distinguishability bound that we present below is based on the notion of distinguishing entangled
states from separable states by means of restricted measurements (for example LOCC measurements). Let
us briefly describe the derivation of the bound. Consider a state, ρin = ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB , and suppose ρin
is highly indistinguishable by LOCC operations between C and AB from some triseparable state σin.
Examples of states ρin with this property were given in [2]: the states are in fact identical private bits
ρACA = ρ˜BCB = ρ (KD(ρ) = 1) and σin is of the form σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB with σACA = σBCB identical and
separable. One may think of them as states that hide entanglement.
Consider now any quantum key repeater protocol Λ. Since Λ is an LOCC operation (between C and
A and B), its output when acting on ρin has to be highly indistinguishable by arbitrary CPTP quantum
operations from its output when acting on σin. But this means that ρout and σout are close in trace norm.
Since σout is separable this means that ρout is close to separable and therefore contains almost no key (and
is certainly no p-bit).
To show the above reasoning formally, we first recall the notion of maximal probability of discrimination
between two states ρ and σ, using some set S of two-outcome POVMs {E0, E1 = 1 − E0} [2, 3]. By
definition we have:
pS(ρ, σ) = sup
{E0,E1}∈S
1
2
trE0ρ+
1
2
trE1σ. (12)
In what follows we will consider several sets of operations: LOCC, SEP, PPT and ALL. The set ALL is
the set of all two-outcome POVMs. PPT consists only of elements that have a positive partial transpose and
SEP contains only separable elements, whereas LOCC are those POVMs that can be implemented by an
LOCC protocol. Note that LOCC ⊂ SEP ⊂ PPT ⊂ ALL.
Lemma 1 For any two states ρ, ρ˜, two separable states σ, σ˜ and any Λ ∈ LOCC(A : C : B),
‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1 ≤ ‖(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB )Γ − (σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )Γ‖1, (13)
where ρˆ = TrCΛ(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB ) and σˆ = TrCΛ(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB ) are the AB outputs of the protocol.
Proof Since Λ is LOCC, it is a tri-separable map, that is has its Kraus representation Λ(ρ) =
∑
iM
i
A ⊗
M iB ⊗M iC(ρ)M i†A ⊗M i†B ⊗M i†C . In particular it is separable in the cut AB : C, which will be crucial
in what follows. Moreover, upon input of any two separable states σACA ⊗ σBCB , the map outputs a state
ρABC with TrCρABC separable. We now prove the following chain of (in)equalities and comment on them
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below:
1 +
1
2
‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1 = 2pALL(ρˆ, σˆ) (14)
= sup
{Ej}∈ALL
[trE0ρˆ+ trE1σˆ] (15)
= sup
{EjAB}∈ALL
[trE0AB trC Λ(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB ) + trE1AB trC Λ(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )] (16)
= sup
{EjAB}∈ALL
[tr(E0AB ⊗ 1 C)Λ(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB ) + tr(E1AB ⊗ 1 C)Λ(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )]
(17)
= sup
{EjAB}∈ALL
∑
j
tr(M j†A ⊗M j†B ⊗M j†C (E0AB ⊗ 1 C)M jA ⊗M jB ⊗M jC(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB ))
+
∑
j
tr(M j†A ⊗M j†B ⊗M j†C (E1AB ⊗ 1 C)M jA ⊗M jB ⊗M jC(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB ))

(18)
≤ 2pSEP(AB:C)(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB , σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB ) (19)
≤ 2pPPT(AB:C)(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB , σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB ) (20)
= sup
{F j≥0,∑j F j=1 ,(F j)Γ≥0}[trF
0(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB ) + trF 1(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )] (21)
= sup
{F j≥0,∑j F j=1 ,(F j)Γ≥0}[trF
0Γ(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB )Γ + trF 1
Γ
(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )Γ] (22)
≤ sup
{∑j F j=1 ,(F j)Γ≥0}[trF
0Γ(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB )Γ + trF 1
Γ
(σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )Γ] (23)
= 2pALL((ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB )Γ, (σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )Γ) (24)
= 1 +
1
2
‖(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜BCB )Γ − (σACA ⊗ σ˜BCB )Γ‖1. (25)
The first equality is the well known Helstrom formula for optimally distinguishing two quantum states.
Subsequently, we simply insert the definitions step by step. Inequality (18) follows from the fact that Λ
is a tri-separable map. In the next inequality we use SEP ⊂ PPT. Then we write this explicitly out and
partially transpose all the C systems. Then we drop the positivity constraint on the POVM elements and
see that the remaining maximisation extends over all POVMs. Using Helstrom once again concludes the
calculation. uunionsq
The above lemma shows that the trace norm distance between the output states of any quantum key
repeater protocol is upper bounded by the trace norm distance of the partially transposed input states of it.
Combining this result with asymptotic continuity of relative entropy of entanglement gives the following
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theorem:
Theorem 2 Consider any two states ρ, ρ˜, and separable states σ, σ˜ in B(Cd⊗Cd) such that ‖ρΓ−σΓ‖1 ≤ 
and ‖ρ˜Γ − σ˜Γ‖1 ≤ , Then, if µ := min{‖ρΓ‖1, ‖ρ˜Γ‖1} satisfies ′ := (µ+ 1) ≤ 13 , we have
Ksingle copyA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) ≤ 4(1 + log d)′ + 2η(′), (26)
with η(x) = −x log x. Here, Ksingle copyA↔C↔B is the quantum key repeater rate when the repeater is restricted to
act on single copies ρ⊗ ρ˜ only.
Proof Let us consider ‖(ρ⊗ ρ˜)Γ− (σ⊗ σ˜)Γ‖1. By adding and subtracting either (ρ⊗ σ˜)Γ or (σ⊗ ρ˜)Γ, and
by triangle inequality, we obtain
‖(ρ⊗ ρ˜)Γ − (σ ⊗ σ˜)Γ‖1 ≤ (min{‖ρΓ‖1, ‖ρ˜Γ‖1}+ 1). (27)
By Lemma 1 and the asymptotic continuity of the relative entropy of entanglement [4] we find
|ER(ρˆ)− ER(σˆ)| ≤ 4(1 + log d)‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1 + 2η(‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1), (28)
which, by separability of σˆ implies
ER(ρˆ) ≤ 4(1 + log d)′ + 2η(′). (29)
Since KD ≤ ER [1, 5] we have proven the claim. uunionsq
Example: p-bit with X = SWAP
Since the single copy quantum key repeater rate is upper bounded by the general quantum key repeater
rate, the example from Supplementary Note 4 can also be used to illustrate the above theorem. We therefore
choose to provide an example in this section, which, we believe, is not amenable to the bounds presented
elsewhere in this paper.
We consider ρ = ρ˜ = γV , where γV is the private state from [1], shown to be entanglement hiding
in [2]. It is defined by (8) for X = V
d2s
with V =
∑ds−1
i,j=0 |ij〉〈ji| the swap operator. Note, that for any
private bit described by operator X as in (8), we have ‖γΓ‖1 = 1 + ‖XΓ‖1 (see proof of Theorem 6.5 of
[2]). Now, following [2], as a state which is separable and highly indistinguishable from γV , we take γV
dephased on the key part of Alice: σ := σ˜ := 12 [|0〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗
√
XX† + |1〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗
√
X†X].
Then ‖γΓV −σΓ‖1 = ‖XΓ‖1 and ‖XΓ‖1 = ‖V
Γ
d2s
‖1 = ‖dsP+d2s ‖1 =
1
ds
where P+ = 1ds
∑ds−1
i,j=0 |ii〉〈jj|. Thus,
‖γΓV − σΓ‖1 = 1ds , which for ds ≥ 7 by Theorem 2 (with ′ = 2ds+1d2s ) implies that
K
single copy
A↔C↔B (γV ⊗ γV ) ≤
4(2ds + 1)(log ds + 1)
d2s
+ 2η
(
2ds + 1
d2s
)
. (30)
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Note that the right hand side of the above inequality vanishes with large ds. It cannot be exactly zero,
though, because perfect p-bits always have some non-zero, albeit sometimes small, distillable entanglement
[6]. This means that γV , although being a private bit (KD(γV ) ≥ 1 by definition), in fact withKD(γV ) = 1
[5], cannot be extended by a single copy quantum key repeater for large enough ds.
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Supplementary Note 3
Restricted Relative Entropy Bound
In this section we derive an asymptotic version of the distinguishability bound, that is, one that upper
bounds KA↔C↔B . The quantity which upper bounds the quantum key repeater rate measures the distin-
guishability of the state to the next separable state in terms of the relative entropy distance of the probability
distributions that can be obtained by LOCC.
Let LOCC(A : B) be the set of POVMs which can be implemented with local operations and classical
communication. We think of an element of this class as the corresponding CPTP map, that is instead of
a POVM given by {Mi} we consider the CPTP map M : X 7→
∑
i(trMiX)|i〉〈i|. Note that M(ρ) is a
probability distribution for ρ a density operator. Our first bound on the quantum key repeater rate is given
in terms of the following quantities:
DC↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) := inf
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
sup
M∈LOCC(C:AB)
D(M(ρ⊗ ρ˜)‖M(σ)), (31)
DC→AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) := inf
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
sup
M∈LOCC(C→AB)
D(M(ρ⊗ ρ˜)‖M(σ)). (32)
We denote by D∞ the regularised versions of the above quantities. Note that for trivial ρ˜, the measures
reduce to the measures defined in [7]. Sometimes, we omit the minimisation over separable states in which
case we write DC↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB‖σACACBB).
Before we prove the bound we need an easy lemma that shows that DALL (as defined by Piani [7]) is
normalised to (at least) m on private states γm [1, 5] containing at least m bits of pure privacy.
Lemma 3 For γ˜m ≈ γm and σ separable we have
DALL(γ˜m‖σ) ≥ (1− )m− h(). (33)
Proof Recall that γm is of the form UPm ⊗ ρA′B′U † for Pm the projector onto the maximally entangled
state in dimension 2m on systems AB and U a controlled unitary with control A and target A′B′. ρA′B′ is
arbitrary. We calculate:
DALL(γ˜m‖σ) ≥ DALL(trA′B′ Uγ˜mU †‖ trA′B′ UσU †) (34)
= DALL(P˜m‖σ˜) (35)
≥ D({trPmP˜m, tr(1 − Pm)P˜m}‖{trPmσ˜, tr(1 − Pm)σ˜}) (36)
≥ (1− )m− h(). (37)
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The first inequality holds due to monotonicity ofDALL. Note that P˜m := trA′B′ Uγ˜mU † is a state -close
to Pm. We also defined σ˜ = trA′B′ UσU †. The second inequality is again an application of monotonicity,
this time with the measurement map given by the POVM {Pm, 1 − Pm}. The last inequality follows from
the proof of [5, Lemma 7] which says that trPmσ˜ ≤ 1/2m and trPmP˜m ≥ 1 − , which follows from
γ˜m ≈ γm. uunionsq
We now come to the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 The following inequalities hold for all states ρ and ρ˜:
KA↔C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤ D∞C↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB), (38)
KA←C→B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤ D∞C→AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB). (39)
Proof We will start with proving the first bound. Fix  > 0. Then, there is an n and a Λ ∈ LOCC(An ↔
Cn ↔ Bn) (in the following we will suppress n if obvious from the context), such that r ≥ KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗
ρ˜)−  and γ˜ := trC Λ((ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)⊗n) ≈ γbnrc. For σ ∈ SEP(A : CA : CB : B) we have
max
M∈LOCC(C↔AB)
D(M(ρ⊗nACA ⊗ ρ˜⊗nCBB)‖M(σACB)) (40)
≥ max
M∈LOCC(C↔AB)
D(M(trC Λ(ρ
⊗n
ACA
⊗ ρ˜⊗nCBB))‖M(trC Λ(σACB))) (41)
= max
M∈ALL(AB)
D(M(trC Λ(ρ
⊗n
ACA
⊗ ρ˜⊗nCBB))‖M(trC Λ(σACB))) (42)
= max
M∈ALL(AB)
D(M(γ˜AB)‖M(σ˜AB)). (43)
The first inequality is true as M ◦ trC ◦Λ ∈ LOCC(C ↔ AB). The first equality follows as the argu-
ments have no system C anymore (or equivalently a one-dimensional system C) and since in this case
LOCC(C ↔ AB) = ALL(AB). In the last equality we have used the definition of γ˜ and introduced
σ˜ := trC Λ(σ). Noting that σ˜ ∈ SEP(A : B) is separable (since Λ ∈ LOCC(A↔ C ↔ B) and
σ ∈ SEP(A : CA : CB : B) ⊂ SEP(A : C : B)) and that γ˜ ≈ γbnrc we have from Lemma 3:
max
M∈ALL(AB)
D(M(γ˜AB)‖M(σ˜AB)) ≥ (1− )bnrc − h(). (44)
Combining the bounds, minimizing over σ and taking the limit n→∞ gives
D∞C↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≥ (1− )r (45)
Since r ≥ KA↔C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)−  and  was arbitrary we have proven the first claim.
The second claim follows by slight modification: restrict Λ to be in LOCC(A ← C → B) and note
that M ◦ trC ◦Λ ∈ LOCC(C → AB) and that LOCC(C → AB) = ALL(AB) for trivial system C. Then
KA↔C↔B will turn into KA←C→B and DC↔AB into DC→AB . uunionsq
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Properties of the Restricted Relative Entropy Measure
In this section we present two properties of the distinguishability measure, its invariance under partial
transposition of the C system and its LOCC monotonicity. The former provides us with a slightly weaker
version of the relative entropy of entanglement bound in Theorem 13.
Lemma 5 For all states ρ and ρ˜,
DC↔AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) = DC↔AB(ρΓACA ⊗ ρ˜ΓCBB), (46)
DC→AB(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) = DC→AB(ρΓACA ⊗ ρ˜ΓCBB). (47)
Proof It is sufficient to observe that the sets of measurements which we denote by LOCC as a placeholder
for either LOCC(C ↔ AB) or LOCC(C → AB) and the set of separable states are invariant under taking
partial transpose of systems C (or AB):
min
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
M∈LOCC
D(M(ρ⊗ ρ˜)‖M(σ)) (48)
= min
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
M∈LOCC
D(MΓ(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ)‖MΓ(σΓ)) (49)
= min
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
M∈LOCC
D(M(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ)‖M(σ)). (50)
uunionsq
By the monotonicity of the relative entropy, we can upper bound D∞C↔AB by the relative entropy of
entanglement and, using the invariance of D∞C↔AB under partial transpose of the C system (Lemma 5),
obtain
Corollary 6 The following inequality holds for all PPT states ρCAA and ρ˜CBB:
KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) ≤ E∞R (ρΓ) + E∞R (ρ˜Γ). (51)
and thereby almost recover the relative entropy bound from Theorem 13. This lets us also conclude that
D∞A↔B(ρ), which can similarly be upper bounded by ER(ρ
Γ), can be made strictly smaller than KD(ρ):
simply take the states from Proposition 14. The observation that D∞A↔B may be strictly smaller than KD
was first made by Matthias Christandl and Robert Pisarczyk in order to answer a question posed in [8].
We conclude with proving the monotonicity of the bound.
Lemma 7 Let Λ ∈ LOCC(CA ↔ A) and Λ′ ∈ LOCC(CA → A). Then,
DC↔AB(ρ⊗ ρ˜) ≥
∑
i
piDC↔AB(ρi ⊗ ρ˜), (52)
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and
DC→AB(ρ⊗ ρ˜) ≥
∑
i
p′iDC→AB(ρ
′
i ⊗ ρ˜), (53)
where Λ(ρ) =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| ⊗ ρi and Λ′(ρ) =
∑
i p
′
i|i〉〈i| ⊗ ρ′i. Similar statements hold for A and B
exchanged.
Proof We prove the statements for the↔ case.
DC↔AB(ρ⊗ ρ˜) = inf
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
M∈LOCC(C↔AB)
D(M(ρ⊗ ρ˜)‖M(σ)) (54)
≥ inf
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
M∈LOCC(C↔AB)
D(M(Λ(ρ⊗ ρ˜))‖M(Λ(σ))) (55)
= inf
σ∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
Mi∈LOCC(C↔AB)
∑
i
piD(Mi(ρi ⊗ ρ˜)‖Mi(σi)) +D(p‖q), (56)
where we used Λ(σ) =
∑
i qi|i〉〈i| ⊗ σi and without loss of generality M =
∑
i |i〉〈i| ⊗Mi. This is lower
bounded by
inf
σi∈SEP(A:CA:CB :B)
max
Mi∈LOCC(C↔AB)
∑
i
piD(Mi(ρi ⊗ ρ˜)‖Mi(σi)) =
∑
i
piDC↔AB(ρi ⊗ ρ˜). (57)
The other cases are similar. uunionsq
Squashed Entanglement Bound
It is the goal of this section to derive a bound on the one-way quantum key repeater rate by the squashed
entanglement. For this goal, we need two lemmas in order to prepare for the key lemma, Lemma 10.
Lemma 8 For any two states ρABE and σABE and for every M ∈ LOCC(A2 → B2) with output denoted
by X there is a sequence Tn ∈ LOCC(An → Bn) with cq output XnBn such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(T cn(ρ
⊗n
AB)
⊗2‖T cn(σ⊗nAB)⊗2) = D(M(ρ⊗2AB)‖M(σ⊗2AB)), (58)
lim
n→∞ ‖T
q
n ⊗ idE(ρ⊗nABE)− ρ⊗nBE‖1 = 0, (59)
where we defined T qn = trXn ◦Tn and T cn = trBn ◦Tn.
Proof Apply [8, Lemma 5] to the states ρ 7→ ρ⊗2 and σ 7→ σ⊗2. Then manipulate the left hand side of their
first equation: First, we use the additivity of the relative entropy
D(T cn(ρ
⊗2n
AB )⊗ T cn(ρ⊗2nAB )‖T cn(σ⊗2nAB )⊗ T cn(σ⊗2nAB )) = 2D(T cn(ρ⊗2nAB )‖T cn(σ⊗2nAB )) (60)
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in order to conclude
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(T cn(ρ
⊗2n
AB )‖T cn(σ⊗2nAB )) = limn→∞
1
2n
D(T cn(ρ
⊗2n
AB )⊗ T cn(ρ⊗2nAB )‖T cn(σ⊗2nAB )⊗ T cn(σ⊗2nAB )). (61)
In a next step we restrict the limit to even n (thereby not changing the limiting value) and make the replace-
ment n 7→ n/2 to obtain
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(T cn/2(ρ
⊗n
AB)
⊗2‖T cn/2(σ⊗nAB)⊗2). (62)
Finally, we redefine Tn/2 7→ Tn and obtain the claim. uunionsq
Lemma 9 For any tri-tripartite state ρ,
2E∞R (ρB:AE) ≥ D∞A2→B2(ρ⊗2AB) + 2E∞R (ρB:E). (63)
Proof For a state σ ∈ SEP(B : AE),
nD(ρ⊗2ABE‖σ⊗2ABE) = D(ρ⊗2n‖σ⊗2n) (64)
≥ D(Tn ⊗ idE(ρ⊗n)⊗2‖Tn ⊗ idE(σ⊗n)⊗2) (65)
= D(T cn(ρ
⊗n)⊗2‖T cn(σ⊗n)⊗2) +
∑
ij
pipjD(ρi ⊗ ρj‖σi ⊗ σj) (66)
≥ D(T cn(ρ⊗n)⊗2‖T cn(σ⊗n)⊗2) +D(T qn ⊗ idE(ρ⊗n)⊗ T qn ⊗ idE(ρ⊗n)‖σ˜ ⊗ σ˜) (67)
≥ D(T cn(ρ⊗n)⊗2‖T cn(σ⊗n)⊗2) (68)
+ min
σ˜∈SEP(B:E)
D(T qn ⊗ idE(ρ⊗n)⊗ T qn ⊗ idE(ρ⊗n)‖σ˜ ⊗ σ˜). (69)
The first inequality follows from the monotonicity of the relative entropy under CPTP maps, the following
equality is a direct calculation, where the ensemble {pi, ρi} ({qi, σi}) is the output of the instrument Tn⊗idE
when applied to ρ⊗nABE and σ
⊗n
ABE , respectively. The subsequent inequality is due to convexity of the relative
entropy, where we defined the state σ˜ := T qn ⊗ idE(σ⊗n). Since T q ⊗ idE ∈ LOCC(B : AE) and
σ ∈ SEP(B : AE), we find σ˜ ∈ SEP(B : E). This explains the last inequality. Using Lemma 8, the
asymptotic continuity of the relative entropy of entanglement [4] and taking the limit n→∞ proves
D(ρ⊗2ABE‖σ⊗2ABE) ≥ D(M(ρ⊗2AB)‖M(σ⊗2AB)) + limn→∞
1
n
min
σ˜∈SEP(B:E)
D(ρ⊗nBE ⊗ ρ⊗nBE‖σ˜BE ⊗ σ˜BE). (70)
We now maximise this statement over measurements, then minimise over σ. This proves
2ER(ρB:AE) ≥ inf
σ
max
M
D(M(ρ⊗2AB)‖M(σ⊗2)) + 2E∞R (ρB:E). (71)
The right hand side is lower bounded by DA2→B2(ρAB ⊗ ρAB) + 2E∞R (ρB:E). Regularizing this result we
obtain the claimed bound. uunionsq
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Lemma 10
D∞A2→B2(ρAB ⊗ ρAB) ≤ 4Esq(ρAB). (72)
Proof From Lemma 9 we have
2E∞R (ρB:AE)− 2E∞R (ρB:E) ≥ D∞A2→B2(ρ⊗2AB). (73)
By [9, Lemma 1] the left hand side is upper bounded by 2I(A : B|E)ρ. Minimizing over all extensions of
ρABE for a fixed ρAB proves the claim. uunionsq
Combining Lemma 10 with Theorem 4 and Lemma 5 we get the following bound, which is a weaker
version of the squashed entanglement bound in Theorem 13
Corollary 11 The following inequality holds for all PPT states ρCAA = ρCBB:
KA←C→B(ρ⊗ ρ) ≤ 4Esq(ρΓ). (74)
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Supplementary Note 4
Let us assume that Alice shares a PPT state ρwith Charlie and that Bob shares a PPT state ρ˜with Charlie
and that they apply an LOCC operation Λ among the three of them at the end of which Charlie traces out
his part of the system. It is the observation of this section that they obtain the identical output state had they
applied the LOCC operation ΛΓ (the operation where Charlie’s Kraus operators are complex conjugated)
to the partially transposed states ρΓ and ρ˜Γ instead. As a consequence, the quantum key repeater rate is
invariant under partial transposition: KA↔C↔B(ρ ⊗ ρ˜) = KA↔C↔B(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ). The invariance remains
true when restricting partially or fully to one-way communication. In the following, we make this statement
precise and use it to find upper bounds. We then give examples illustrating the power of the idea and
comparing the obtained bounds.
Bounds by Key, Relative Entropy of Entanglement and Squashed Entanglement
We start with the above mentioned invariance property.
Lemma 12 Let ρ and ρ˜ be PPT. Then
KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) = KA↔C↔B(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ), (75)
where the transpose is taken w.r.t. Charlie’s subsystems.
Proof Note that every LOCC protocol can be implemented by many rounds of local POVMs and classical
communication. If Charlie uses the complex conjugate of all of his Kraus operators S(k)C , we have another
valid LOCC protocol. Since
TrC
[(
. . .⊗ (S(1)∗C · · ·S(r)∗C )⊗ . . .
)
ρΓACA ⊗ ρ˜ΓCBB
(
. . .⊗ (S(r)∗C
† · · ·S(1)∗C
†
)⊗ . . .
)]
(76)
= TrC
[(
. . .⊗ (S(1)C · · ·S(r)C )⊗ . . .
)
ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB
(
. . .⊗ (S(r)C
† · · ·S(1)C
†
)⊗ . . .
)]
, (77)
every protocol applied to copies of ρ⊗ ρ˜ has the same output as when the protocol with complex conjugated
Kraus operators is applied to ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ. Consequently, we find
KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) = KA↔C↔B(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ). (78)
Recall that this statement only makes sense for PPT states ρ and ρ˜. uunionsq
By the monotonicity of distillable key, we have KA↔C↔B(ρ ⊗ ρ˜) ≤ KD(ρACA). Since the relative
entropy of entanglement and squashed entanglement are upper bounds on the key rate [1, 10], that is the
right hand side, we obtain the following bounds
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Theorem 13 Let ρ and ρ˜ be PPT. Then
KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) ≤ min
{
KD(ρ
Γ),KD(ρ˜
Γ)
} ≤ min{E∞R (ρΓ), E∞R (ρ˜Γ), Esq(ρΓ), Esq(ρ˜Γ)} , (79)
where the transpose is taken w.r.t. Charlie’s subsystems.
The relative entropy of entanglement [11] is given by
ER(ρ) = inf
σ∈SEP
D(ρ‖σ), (80)
where SEP denotes the set of separable states. Since it is subadditive, it upper bounds its regularised version
E∞R (ρ) = limn→∞
1
n
ER(ρ
⊗n). (81)
The squashed entanglement [12, 13] is given by
Esq(ρAB) = inf
ρABE
1
2
I(A : B|E)ρABE , (82)
where ρABE is an arbitrary extension of ρAB .
Example: PPT state close to p-bit
In the following we exhibit an example, where the right hand sides of our bounds are very small, but
where the state itself has a high key rate. The idea here is simple, we find PPT states that have high key but
whose partial transpose is close to a separable state [2]. More precisely, we present a family of states {ρds}s
of increasing dimension which asymptotically reach the gap of 1 between KD(ρds) and KA↔C↔B(ρ
⊗2
ds
).
Their construction is based on [14]; there, two private bits were mixed to give a PPT key distillable state.
Here we take only one of the p-bits and admix the block-diagonal part of the second one. Alternatively, one
may use the family of PPT key distillable states introduced in [1, 5], but we omit this argument, since it is
more involved.
Proposition 14 There are PPT states ρds ∈ B(C2 ⊗C2 ⊗Cds ⊗Cds), obtained by admixing a ps-fraction
of a separable state to a p-bit, such that ρΓds is ps-close to a separable state in trace norm. Furthermore,
ps =
1√
ds+1
and ds →∞ for large ds.
Proof Our construction of ρds is based on [14]. Consider
ρds =
1
2

(1− p)
√
XX† 0 0 (1− p)X
0 p
√
Y Y † 0 0
0 0 p
√
Y †Y 0
(1− p)X† 0 0 (1− p)
√
X†X
 , (83)
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with
X =
1
ds
√
ds
ds∑
i,j=1
uij |ij〉〈ji| (84)
and
Y =
√
dsX
Γ =
1
ds
ds∑
i,j=1
uij |ii〉〈jj|. (85)
Here, ps = 1√ds+1 and uij are the matrix elements of some (arbitrary) unitary matrix U acting on C
ds that
satisfies |uij | = 1/
√
ds for all i, j. For example, we may set U to be quantum Fourier transform
U |k〉 =
ds∑
j=1
√
1
ds
e2piijk/ds |j〉. (86)
Note that ρds is a mixture of private state (defined by X) with probability 1 − p and a with separable
state 12 [|0〉〈0|⊗ |1〉〈1|⊗
√
Y Y †+ |1〉〈1|⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗
√
Y †Y ] with probability p. It is easy to see that the state
is PPT, as (1− p)XΓ = pY . So after partial transposition of BB′:
ρΓds =
1
2

(1− p)
√
XX† 0 0 0
0 p
√
Y Y † pY 0
0 pY † p
√
Y †Y 0
0 0 0 (1− p)
√
X†X
 , (87)
which is evidently non-negative, as
√
XX† and
√
X†X are non-negative by definition, and the middle block
is (up to normalisation factor p) a private bit defined by operator Y [5].
Consider now the state ρds dephased on the first qubit of Alice’s system (this state is also known as “key
attacked state”). It reads:
σds =
1
2

(1− p)
√
XX† 0 0 0
0 p
√
Y Y † 0 0
0 0 p
√
Y †Y 0
0 0 0 (1− p)
√
X†X
 , (88)
and is clearly separable. It is easy to see that
‖ρΓds − σΓds‖1 = ‖(1− p)XΓ‖1 = ‖pY ‖1 = p =
1√
ds + 1
. (89)
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
Since the states ρs are obtained by admixing a small fraction of a separable state to a p-bit, the key rate
of the state is high: Alice and Bob’s mutual information in fact equals 1 − h(ps) and the quantum mutual
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information of Alice and Eve is bounded by h(ps). Hence, by [15], K(ρ) ≥ 1 − 2h(ps). On the other
hand, ρΓ is almost separable which implies that K(ρΓ), ER(ρΓ) and Esq(ρΓ) are small. A particularly
good bound is obtained with help of the following lemma.
Lemma 15 Let ρABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd) be a PPT(AA′ : BB′) state and assume that its key
attacked version σABA′B′ =
∑
i(|i〉〈i|A ⊗ 1 )ρ(|i〉〈i|A ⊗ 1 ) is separable. Then if  = ‖ρΓ − σΓ‖1 < 13 , we
have
E∞R (ρ
Γ) ≤ 2 log 2d+ η(), (90)
where η() = − log .
Proof We start by noting that σ and hence σΓ are separable, therefore we have
E∞R (ρ
Γ) ≤ ER(ρΓ) ≤ D(ρΓ‖σΓ) (91)
We write out the right hand side
D(ρΓ‖σΓ) = tr ρΓ log ρΓ − tr ρΓ log σΓ. (92)
and find, since tr ρΓ log σΓ = trσΓ log σΓ (due to the fact that σ is block diagonal) that
D(ρΓ‖σΓ) = H(σΓ)−H(ρΓ). (93)
An application of Fannes’ inequality [16] gives the result. uunionsq
Theorem 16 There are PPT states ρds ∈ B(C2⊗C2⊗Cds ⊗Cds), satisfying KD(ρds) = 1− 2h(ps) with
p = 1√
ds+1
and h the binary Shannon entropy, such that KA↔C↔B(ρds⊗ρds) ≤ 2p log(2ds)+η(p) where
η(p) = −p log p. In summary, there exist states with
1 ≈ KD(ρ) > KA↔C↔B(ρ⊗ ρ) ≈ 0. (94)
Comparison of the Bounds: Werner States
In the following we show that the bound by the squashed entanglement can be smaller than the one
by the relative entropy of entanglement. Recall that it was previously known that squashed entanglement
of the antisymmetric Werner state is smaller than its relative entropy of entanglement [10, 17]. Since the
antisymmetric Werner state is not PPT, however, this example does not apply directly to our situation. Using
a related PPT state from [18], we are able to obtain our goal. We leave open the question of whether the
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relative entropy of entanglement can be smaller than squashed entanglement. This, however, seems very
plausible, as squashed entanglement is lockable [19], and the relative entropy is not [20]. The challenge
therefore remains to show locking of squashed entanglement for a PPT state.
Let τ± be the symmetric and antisymmetric Werner state. In [18] it is shown that
ρn := wτ⊗n− + (1− w)τ⊗n (95)
is PPT for w = 1/(1 + zn) for z = (d+ 2)/d, p = (d+ 1)/(d+ 2) and τ := (1− p)τ− + pτ+. Note that
Esq(ρ
n) ≤ nEsq(τ−), (96)
since τ is separable. By a result of [10], Esq(τ−) ≤ O(1/d) hence we find
Esq(ρ
n) ≤ O(n/d). (97)
Let us now derive a lower bound on the regularised relative entropy of this state. Since the relative entropy
is not lockable we find
ER((ρ
n)⊗k) ≥
∑
j
(
k
j
)
wj(1− w)k−jER(τ⊗jn− ⊗ τ⊗(k−j)n)− kh(w) (98)
=
∑
j
(
k
j
)
wj(1− w)k−jER(τ⊗jn− )− kh(w) (99)
≈ ER(τ⊗wkn− )− kh(w), (100)
where we used the separability of τ in the first equality and the law of large numbers in the second. Taking
the large k limit we find
E∞R (ρ
n) ≥ wnE∞R (τ−)− h(w). (101)
By [10], E∞R (τ−) is lower bounded by a constant independent of d. Setting n = O(d) we find w = O(1)
(which can be made arbitrarily small) and henceE∞R (ρ
n) ≥ O(n). From the bound aboveEsq(ρn) ≤ O(1).
Hence there are PPT states ρˆ for which
Esq(ρˆ) E∞R (ρˆ). (102)
Since ρ := ρˆΓ is again a PPT state we also find that there are PPT states ρ for which
Esq(ρ
Γ) E∞R (ρΓ). (103)
This shows that the squashed entanglement bound may be stronger than the regularised relative entropy
bound.
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Supplementary Note 5
Entanglement Distillation and Cost Bound
We will now present an upper bound on the quantum key repeater rate that depends on the distillable
entanglement of the input state.
Theorem 17 For input states ρACA and ρ˜CBB it holds
KA←C↔B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤
1
2
ED(ρ˜CBB) +
1
2
EC(ρACA), (104)
KA←C→B(ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB) ≤
1
2
ECB→BD (ρ˜CBB) +
1
2
EC(ρACA), (105)
where ECB→BD denotes the one-way distillable entanglement. In case of PPT states, we may also transpose
the states on the C system.
Our result implies that if one of the input states is bound entangled or has small distillable entanglement, the
other state has to ’compensate’ this lack of distillability by its entanglement cost. Before proving Theorem
17, we consider the classical squashed entanglement [13], denoted by Esq,c, a variant of the squashed
entanglement where the extensions are restricted to being classical, that is ρABE =
∑
i piρ
(i)
AB ⊗ |i〉〈i|E . If
we further restrict ourselves to ρABE =
∑
i pi|Ψ(i)〉〈Ψ(i)|AB ⊗ |i〉〈i|E , that is pure states ρi = |Ψ(i)〉〈Ψ(i)|,
we get the entanglement of formation [13]. Clearly, Esq ≤ Esq,c ≤ EF , and all inequalities can be strict,
for example for the antisymmetric state [10, 17]. Furthermore, in [10, 17, 21] it was shown that KD ≤ Esq.
The proof of Theorem 17 is based on the following lemmas. First, a small technical observation:
Lemma 18 For any bipartite state ρAB it holds ED(ρAB) ≥ EB→AD (ρAB) ≥ 2Esq,c(ρAB)−H(B)ρ.
Proof Using the definition of the classical squashed entanglement and the hashing inequality [15], we have
2Esq,c(ρAB) ≤ I(A : B)ρ = H(B)ρ −H(B|A)ρ ≤ H(B)ρ + EB→AD (ρAB). uunionsq
Lemma 18 gives us the following upper bound on the classical squashed entanglement of τ :
Lemma 19 For LOCC(A← C ↔ B) protocols resulting in τA′B′ there holds
Esq,c(τA′B′) ≤ 1
2
ED(ρ˜CBB) +
1
2
EF (ρACA). (106)
Proof For any LOCC(A← C ↔ B) protocol there exists a two step protocol of the following form that
results in the same state: First, Charlie and Bob perform an LOCC operation Λ on their subsystems after
which Charlies system is discarded. As part of Λ, any classical message intended for Alice is stored at
Bobs site, for now. This results in a state σAB′ = TrC [1A ⊗ ΛCB (ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)], where Alices message
30
is contained in the B′ subsystem. In a second step, Bob sends the classical message to Alice who then
performs a local operation depending on the message. This results in state τA′B′ .
Let {qj , |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA} be an ensemble such that ρACA =
∑
j qj |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA and EF (ρACA) =∑
j qjH(A)|Ψj〉〈Ψj |. For every j, applying the first step of the protocol to |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA⊗ ρ˜CBB alone results
in a state σ(j)AB′ = TrC [1A ⊗ ΛCB (|Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)]. By linearity we have σAB′ =
∑
j qjσ
(j)
AB′ . By
Lemma 18, it holds
ED(σ
(j)
AB′) ≥ 2Esq,c(σ(j)AB′)−H(A)σ(j) = 2Esq,c(σ(j)AB′)−H(A)|Ψj〉〈Ψj |, (107)
where I have used the fact that the A subsystem remains untouched in the first step. Applying the convex
sum results in ∑
j
qjED(σ
(j)
AB′) ≥
∑
j
qj2Esq,c(σ
(j)
AB′)− EF (ρACA). (108)
As the second step of the protocol is LOCC, using the convexity and LOCC monotonicity of the classical
squashed entanglement [22], we obtain
∑
j qjEsq,c(σ
(j)
AB′) ≥ Esq,c(τA′B′). In order to get rid of the convex
sum in front ofED, one can apply its LOCC monotonicity in a scenario where Alice and Charlie are sharing
a lab. Namely, we need an LOCC(AC ↔ B) protocol, transferring ρ˜CBB into the ensemble {qj , σ(j)AB′}.
Such a protocol exists: If Alice and Charlie share a lab they will be able to locally create the ensemble
{qj , |Ψj〉〈Ψj |}. Then all that is left to do is to apply the first part of the swapping protocol. By the LOCC
monotonicity of ED it holds ED(ρ˜CBB) ≥
∑
j qjED(σ
(j)
AB′), finishing the proof. uunionsq
Similarly, we can show the following
Lemma 20 For LOCC(A← C → B) protocols resulting in τA′B′ there holds
Esq,c(τA′B′) ≤ 1
2
ECB→BD (ρ˜CBB) +
1
2
EF (ρACA). (109)
Proof For any LOCC(A← C → B) protocol there exists a two step protocol of the following form
that results in the same state: First, Charlie and Bob perform an LOCC(C → B) operation Λ on their
subsystems after which Charlies system is discarded. As part of Λ, any classical message intended for
Alice is stored at Bobs site, for now. This results in a state σAB′ = TrC [1A ⊗ ΛCB (ρACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)],
where Alices message is contained in the B′ subsystem. In a second step, Bob sends the classical message
to Alice who then performs a local operation depending on the message. This results in state τA′B′ .
Let {qj , |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA} be an ensemble such that ρACA =
∑
j qj |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA and EF (ρACA) =∑
j qjH(A)|Ψj〉〈Ψj |. For every j, applying the first step of the protocol to |Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA⊗ ρ˜CBB alone results
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in a state σ(j)AB′ = TrC [1A ⊗ ΛCB (|Ψj〉〈Ψj |ACA ⊗ ρ˜CBB)]. By linearity we have σAB′ =
∑
j qjσ
(j)
AB′ . By
Lemma 18, it holds
EA→B
′
D (σ
(j)
AB′) ≥ 2Esq,c(σ(j)AB′)−H(A)σ(j) = 2Esq,c(σ(j)AB′)−H(A)|Ψj〉〈Ψj |, (110)
where I have used the fact that the A subsystem remains untouched in the first step. Applying the convex
sum results in ∑
j
qjE
A→B′
D (σ
(j)
AB′) ≥
∑
j
qj2Esq,c(σ
(j)
AB′)− EF (ρACA). (111)
As the second step of the protocol is LOCC, using the convexity and LOCC monotonicity of the classical
squashed entanglement [22], we obtain
∑
j qjEsq,c(σ
(j)
AB′) ≥ Esq,c(τA′B′). In order to get rid of the convex
sum in front of the one-way distillable entanglement, one can apply its LOCC monotonicity in a scenario
where Alice and Charlie are sharing a lab. Namely, we need an LOCC(AC → B) protocol, transferring
ρ˜CBB into the ensemble {qj , σ(j)AB′}. Such a protocol exists: If Alice and Charlie share a lab they will be
able to locally create the ensemble {qj , |Ψj〉〈Ψj |}. Then all that is left to do is to apply the first part of the
swapping protocol. By the one-way LOCC monotonicity of the one-way distillable entanglement it holds
ECB→BD (ρ˜CBB) ≥
∑
j qjE
A→B′
D (σ
(j)
AB′), finishing the proof. uunionsq
We are now ready to prove Theorem 17.
Proof of Theorem 17 LetM be the class of allowed LOCC protocols and let  > 0. Then there exists n
and anM-protocol ΛM such that TrCΛM
(
(ρ⊗ ρ˜)⊗n) ≈ γbnrc and r ≥ KM(ρ ⊗ ρ˜) − . Hence, using
the fact that Esq(γm) ≥ m for any γm [17], as well as the LOCC monotonicity and asymptotic continuity
of Esq, it holds
nKM(ρ⊗ρ˜) ≤ nr+n ≤ Esq(γbnrc)+n ≤ Esq
(
TrCΛ
M ((ρ⊗ ρ˜)⊗n))+const log(dimnA′B′)+f()+n,
(112)
where f()→ 0 as → 0. By Lemma 19 and 20 for respective classesM and the fact that Esq ≤ Esq,c, it
holds
Esq
(
TrCΛ
A←C↔B ((ρ⊗ ρ˜)⊗n)) ≤ 1
2
ED(ρ˜
⊗n) +
1
2
EF (ρ
⊗n) (113)
and
Esq
(
TrCΛ
A←C→B ((ρ⊗ ρ˜)⊗n)) ≤ 1
2
ECB→BD (ρ˜
⊗n) +
1
2
EF (ρ
⊗n). (114)
Let us now divide by n and let  → 0 and n → ∞. Our bounds then follow from the extensitivity of
ED and the fact that the regularised entanglement of formation equals the entanglement cost. If ρ and ρ˜
are PPT, it can be shown analogously to Lemma 12 that KA←C↔B(ρ ⊗ ρ˜) = KA←C↔B(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ) and
KA←C→B(ρ⊗ ρ˜) = KA←C→B(ρΓ ⊗ ρ˜Γ), hence we can also partially transpose ρ and ρ˜. uunionsq
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Example: PPT invariant approximate p-bit (based on data hiding states)
Note that, even though the results in Section may be computed for states without the use of the partial
transpose, all examples were in fact computed using that idea. Therefore, until now, we have not been able
to demonstrate a nontrivial bound for states that are invariant under the partial transpose operation. It is the
goal of this section to demonstrate such an example by help of Theorem 17.
In order to do so, we choose a family of states ρm and based on this, consider states of the form ρ˜m :=
ρm ⊗ ρΓm. Note that ρ˜m is locally equivalent (by bilocal swap) to its partial transposition. The bounds on
using the partial transposition which we presented earlier do therefore not give any interesting bounds in
this situation. As we show below, however, for our choice of ρ˜m we find ED(ρ˜m) = 0 and EC(ρ˜m) . 1.
Inserting this into Theorem 17, we find
KA←C↔B(ρ˜m ⊗ ρ˜m) . 1
2
, (115)
which is significantly smaller than KD(ρ˜m) & 1 (see below).
In order to construct ρm, we consider a family of states on B
(
C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ (Cdk ⊗ Cdk)⊗m
)
given in
[1]:
ρˆp,d,k,m =
1
Nm

[p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m 0 0 [p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 [(12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0 0
0 0 [(12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0
[p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 0 [p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m
 , (116)
where Nm = 2(pm) + 2(12 −p)m, τ1 = (ρa+ρs2 )⊗k and τ2 = (ρs)⊗k, while ρs and ρa are the d-dimensional
symmetric and antisymmetric Werner state, respectively.
The state ρˆp,d,k,m is PPT iff p ≤ 13 and 1−pp ≥ ( dd−1)k [1]. We satisfy this condition by setting p = 13 ,
d = m2 and k = m, as then ( dd−1)
k < 2 for m ≥ 2. Then we define
ρm := ρˆ1/3,m2,m,m, (117)
with m ≥ 2. Since also ρ˜m is PPT, it is bound entangled and we find ED(ρ˜m) = 0. The following lemma
assures us of the fact that entanglement of formation of ρ˜m is bounded by approximately one.
Lemma 21 ρ˜m = ρm ⊗ ρΓm for ρm defined in eq. (117) satisfies EC(ρ˜m) ≤ EF (ρ˜m) ≤ 1 + 2m
2 log(2m)
2m+1 .
Note that this bound is approximately equal to one for large m.
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Proof Observe first that EF (ρ˜m) ≤ EF (ρm) +EF (ρΓm) due to the subadditivity of EF . We show now, that
EF (ρm) ≤ 1. Indeed, observe that (for x = (1/2−p)
m
Nm
)
ρm = (1− 2x)
[
1
2
|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ Seven + 1
2
|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ Sodd
]
+
2x
[
1
2
|01〉〈01| ⊗ τ⊗m2 +
1
2
|10〉〈10| ⊗ τ⊗m2
]
, (118)
where Seven is a uniform mixture (with probability 2−(m−1)) of all states τi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τim such that 2 occurs
even number of times in string (i1, . . . , im), and Sodd is defined analogously, but with number of 2 being
odd, |ψ±〉 = 1√2(|00〉 ± |11〉). It is clear from the above formula, that the state ρm can be created from
2-qubit maximally entangled state appropriately correlated to the sequences of lengthm of separable hiding
states τi, and mixed with probability 2x with a separable state 12(|01〉〈01| ⊗ τ⊗m2 + |10〉〈10| ⊗ τ⊗m2 ).
We now bound EF (ρΓm) from above. Note that
ρΓm =
1
Nm

[p( τ1+τ22 )
Γ]⊗m 0 0 0
0 [(12 − p)τΓ2 ]⊗m [p( τ1−τ22 )Γ]⊗m 0
0 [p( τ1−τ22 )
Γ]⊗m [(12 − p)τΓ2 ]⊗m 0
0 0 0 [p( τ1+τ22 )
Γ]
⊗m
 , (119)
Observe, that [( τ1+τ22 )
Γ] is a separable state, and, therefore, by the convexity of entanglement of formation,
EF (ρ
Γ
m) ≤ 2xEF (ρ′m) where the state ρ′m is formed by middle block of the above matrix:
ρ′m =
1
2(12 − p)m

0 0 0 0
0 [(12 − p)τΓ2 ]⊗m [p( τ1−τ22 )Γ]⊗m 0
0 [p( τ1−τ22 )
Γ]⊗m [(12 − p)τΓ2 ]⊗m 0
0 0 0 0
 . (120)
Since x ≤ 12m , we can safely bound EF (ρ′m) by the logarithm of the local dimension of ρ′m, which equals
2m2m
2
:
EF (ρ
Γ
m) ≤ 2x× 2m2 log(2m). (121)
The assertion follows by inserting p = 1/3 and observing that the entanglement cost is upper bounded by
the entanglement of formation. uunionsq
In the following we show that KD(ρ˜m) & 1 in the limit of large m. We start by noting that KD(ρ˜m) ≥
KD(ρm) and that it therefore suffices to lower boundKD(ρm). We first apply a privacy squeezing operation
to ρm, which gives ρ
ps
m [5]. Note, that this operation on ρm amounts to the replacement of the blocks of the
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matrix given in eq. (116) by their respective trace norms. In turn, the ρpsm is a 2-qubit state described by the
matrix: 
a 0 0 b
0 x 0 0
0 0 x 0
b 0 0 a
 , (122)
where a = p
m
Nm
, x = (1/2−p)
m
Nm
and (by eq. 141 of [5]) b = (p(1−2
−m))m
Nm
. Now, using the fact that
the distillable key of ρm is lower bounded by the Devetak-Winter quantity of a ccq state of the ρ
ps
m (see
Corollary 4.26 of [2]), we observe that:
KD(ρm) ≥ 1−H(a+ b, a− b, x, x), (123)
where H is the Shannon entropy. This is what we aimed to prove, as in the limit of large m the above
considered distribution approaches (1, 0, 0, 0) for our choice of p. uunionsq
Private states with bounded key repeater rate
In this section we provide a family of private bits γm, such that KA←C↔B approaches 12 for large m. In
[5], it is proven that provided a certain submatrix of a state ρ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd) has large enough
trace norm, there exists a private bit γ which is close to ρ in trace norm. Moreover, the construction of γ is
explicit. We choose ρ = ρm, given in (117), as it has ED(ρm) = 0 and EF (ρm) ≤ 1. Using entanglement
theory, we show, that the constructed γm satisfies ED(γm) ≈ 0 and EF (γm) ≈ 1 for large enough m.
Finally we use theorem 17, which under these conditions proves KA←C↔B(γm) ≈ 12 for large m.
We start by recalling the following result.
Proposition 22 [5] If the state σABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′) with a form σABA′B′ =∑1
ijkl=0 |ij〉〈kl|AB ⊗ Aijkl fulfills ||A0011||1 > 12 −  for some 0 <  < 18e2 , then there exists private
bit γ such, that
||σABA′B′ − γABA′B′ ||1 ≤ δ() (124)
where
δ() = 2
√
4
√
2+ η(2
√
2) + 2
√
2 (125)
and η(x) = −x log x. Note, that δ() vanishes, when  approaches zero.
We then obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 23 For ρm as defined in (117) there exists a private bit γm, such that ||γm − ρm|| ≤ δ() with
δ() = 2
√
4
√
2+ η(2
√
2) + 2
√
2 and
 =
2
3
(1− (1− 1
2m
)m × 1
1 + 12m
). (126)
Note that δ = exp(−O(m)).
Proof From [2, (5.18)], we know that by expressing ρ in the form ρm =
∑
ijkl |ij〉〈kl| ⊗Aijkl we find:
||A0011|| = 1
2
(1− 1
2k
)m
1
1 + (1−2p2p )
m
(127)
with k = m and p = 13 . Hence ||A0011|| = 12 −  with  = 12(1− (1− 12m )m × 11+ 1
2m
). Thus increasing 
by the multiplicative factor 43 , we have shown that ρm satisfies the assumptions of proposition 22. uunionsq
We now show how the construction of γm is done explicitly: Consider the submatrix of the state ρm
denoted by A0011 = 1Nm [p(
τ1−τ2
2 )]
⊗m with Nm = 2(pm) + 2(12 − p)m, where p = 13 . Using the singular
decomposition, we write A0011 = U (00)ΣU (11) with U (ii) being unitaries and Σ ≥ 0 a positive operator.
Then
γm = U
†
τ [|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ (trA′B′ UτρmU †τ )]Uτ (128)
where Uτ =
∑
i |ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ V (ii)AB with V (00)AB = U (00)
†
and V (11)AB = U
(11). The idea of the above
construction is that by use of a certain twisting Uτ we can decouple A′B′ from AB as much as possible and
obtain a leftover state on A′B′. Replacing the state on the AB system by the singlet state |ψ−〉〈ψ−| and
applying the inverse of the twisting Uτ we obtain γm. Note that this state is a private state by construction:
it is a ”twisted” singlet [1, 5].
The following lemma provides bounds on the distillable entanglement and the entanglement of formation
of the constructed private bit.
Lemma 24 For γm defined in Eq. (128) satisfies EF (γm) ≤ 1 + exp(−O(m)) and ED(γm) ≤
exp(−O(m)).
Proof By construction we have ||γm − ρm|| ≤ δ(), with appropriate  and δ(). By assumption we have
also EF (ρm) ≤ 1, which, by the asymptotic continuity of entanglement of formation [23], in formulation
of [24], results in
|EF (γm)− EF (ρm)| ≤
√
2δ()2m2 log 2m+ η(
√
2δ()) (129)
provided δ() < 14 . Since EF (ρm) ≤ 1 and δ() = exp(−O(m)) we obtain desired bound.
Now, as it is shown in [25] we have
ED(γm) ≤ EPPTr (γm), (130)
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where EPPTr is the relative entropy of entanglement distance from the set of states with positive partial
transposition. Since this function is asymptotically continuous [24], we have
|EPPTr (γm)− EPPTr (ρm)| ≤ 4η log(2m2m
2
) + 2h(η) (131)
with η = ||γm − ρm||. Since ρm is PPT, we have EPPTr (ρm) = 0. Thus, we obtain
EPPTr (γm) ≤ 4δ()2m2 log 2m+ 2h(δ()) (132)
if only δ() ≤ 12 , which, together with (130) and δ() = exp(−O(m)), proves the claim. uunionsq
Finally, we can prove that γm has limited key repeater rate. To this end we insert the bounds from the
above lemma into theorem 17 and obtain the following statement.
Corollary 25 For the private bits γm defined in Eq. (128), we have
KA←C↔B(γm) .
1
2
(133)
in limit of large m.
On Tightness: A Counterexample for Entanglement Cost
Lemmas 19 and 20 are new inequalities for entanglement measures. It might be worth asking, both
from a practical and an abstract point of view, whether there are more inequalities of that kind for other
entanglement measures. First, let us note that E(τ) ≤ pE(ρ) + (1 − p)E(ρ˜) is trivially fulfilled for all
LOCC-monotonic measures E and all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. What would be interesting instead, is a relation of the
form
E(τ) ≤ pED(ρ˜) + (1− p)E(ρ) or E(τ) ≤ pED(ρ) + (1− p)E(ρ˜), (134)
for some measure E and some weight p. If we had a quantum repeater that iterates the swapping operation
many times, and bound entangled input states, E would be reduced by a factor 1 − p with every step. For
measures that upper bound the distillable key, such as EC , EF , Esq, Esq,c, ER or E∞R , this would be a
significant limitation to quantum key repeaters with bound entangled input states. The same would hold, if
we replaced ED by EN or ER,PPT.
We will now show that forE = EF , the entanglement of formation, andE = EC , the entanglement cost,
(134) cannot hold for all input states. Assume that Bob and Charlie apply the following LOCC protocol.
Charlie performs a generalised Bell state measurement |Ψνµ〉〈Ψνµ|C , where |Ψνµ〉 = 1√d
∑
j ω
jν |j〉 ⊗
|j + µ〉 and ω = e 2piid . (Here and in the following the addition is performed modulo d.) Charlie then
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communicates the result ν, µ classically to Alice and Bob. Upon receiving the message, Bob performs
Uνµ =
∑
j ω
jν |j〉〈j + µ|. Alice and Bob then store µ classically. Charlie’s subsystem is then discarded,
that is given to Eve.
Proposition 26 For the protocol described above, and any 0 < p ≤ 1, there exist states ρ, ρ˜ such that for
E = EF and E = EC
E(τAB) > pED(ρ˜CBB) + (1− p)E(ρACA) and E(τAB) > pED(ρACA) + (1− p)E(ρ˜CBB), (135)
where τ is the state resulting from the protocol.
Our counterexamples are of the form ρAB =
∑d−1
i,k=0 aik|ii〉〈kk|, which admits a purification |Φ〉ABE =
1√
d
∑
i |ii〉 ⊗ |ui〉, where aik = 1d〈uk|ui〉 and the |ui〉 are normalised. Such states are called maximally
correlated. It is easy to see that ρA = ρB = 1d . For maximally correlated states the entanglement measures
involved simplify and τ can be easily calculated. In particular (see [26] and references therein),
ED(ρAB) = ER(ρAB) = log d−H(ρ) (136)
and
EC(ρAB) = EF (ρAB) = log d− Iacc
({
1
d
, |ui〉
})
, (137)
where Iacc
({
1
d , |ui〉
})
= sup{Aj}POVM I(i : j) is the accessible information. Before proceeding with our
counterexample for EF and EC let us note that (134) with E = ER is trivially fulfilled as for all maximally
correlated states ED = ER.
Lemma 27 Let ρACA and ρ˜CBB be maximally correlated, with purifications |Φ1〉ACAEA =
1√
d
∑
i |ii〉ACA ⊗ |ui〉EA and |Φ2〉CBBEB = 1√d
∑
i |ii〉CBB ⊗ |vi〉EB , respectively. Then for every
0 < p ≤ 1, (134) with E = EF or E = EC implies
1
d
∑
µ
Iacc
({
1
d
, |ui〉 ⊗ |vi+µ〉
})
≥ pH(ρ˜) and (138)
1
d
∑
µ
Iacc
({
1
d
, |ui〉 ⊗ |vi+µ〉
})
≥ pH(ρ). (139)
Proof Let 0 < p ≤ 1. Let us first show that maximally correlated states preserve their structure under the
protocol assumed in Proposition 26. The protocol results in a state τAA′BB′ purified by
|Φ˜〉 =
∑
νµ
(1AEAEB ⊗ |Ψνµ〉〈Ψνµ|C ⊗ UνµB )|Φ1〉ACAEA ⊗ |Φ2〉CBBEB ⊗ |µµ〉ab|νµ〉E˜ (140)
=
1√
d
∑
µ
1√
d
∑
i
|ii〉AB ⊗ |ui〉EA ⊗ |vi+µ〉EB︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Φ˜µ〉
⊗|µµ〉ab ⊗ 1√
d
∑
ν
|Ψνµ〉C ⊗ |νµ〉E˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|wµ〉
. (141)
38
Clearly, τµAB := TrEAEB |Φ˜µ〉〈Φ˜µ| is maximally correlated and {|wµ〉} are orthogonal. Therefore Alice and
Bobs final state is given by τAaBb = 1d
∑
µ τ
µ
AB⊗|µµ〉〈µµ|ab. By the convexity and LOCC monotonicity of
EF , it holds that EF (τ) = 1d
∑
µEF (τ
µ). Since we are dealing with maximally correlated states, the same
holds true for EC . Now, assume that we have (134) with E = EF or E = EC . Inserting (136) and (137)
into (134) gives us
1
d
∑
µ
Iacc
({
1
d
, |ui〉 ⊗ |vi+µ〉
})
≥ pH(ρ˜) + (1− p)Iacc
({
1
d
, |ui〉
})
(142)
and the same for ρ and |vi〉. Since the accessible information is always non-negative, this implies the
Lemma. uunionsq
Hence, if we can find an example such that Iacc({1d , |ui〉 ⊗ |vi+µ〉}) < pH(ρ) and Iacc({1d , |ui〉 ⊗
|vi+µ〉}) < pH(ρ˜) for all µ we will have Proposition 26. For this, we make the following ansatz:
|Φ1〉AA′CAC′AEA =
1√
dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|ii〉ACA ⊗ |jj〉A′C′A ⊗ U
j |i〉EA , (143)
|Φ2〉CBC′BBB′EB =
1√
dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|ii〉CBB ⊗ |jj〉C′BB′ ⊗ V
j |i〉EB , (144)
where U j , V j are unitaries. This is a generalisation of the flower states introduced in [20] (see [19]).
Replacing the index i with (i, j), hence also d with dn, it is easy to see that those are maximally correlated
states. Since TrAA′CAC′A |Φ1〉〈Φ1| = TrCBC′BBB′ |Φ2〉〈Φ2| = 1d , we also have H(ρ) = H(ρ˜) = log d.
Consequently, Proposition 26 follows from Lemma 27 and the next proposition.
Proposition 28 There exists d0 ∈ N such that for all d ≥ d0 and n = d8 there are 2n unitaries
U1, . . . , Un, V 1, . . . , V n such that for all α = 1, . . . , n, β = 1, . . . , d,
Iacc
({
1
dn
, U j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB
})
≤ O(1). (145)
Before we can prove Proposition 28 we need several technical lemmas. Let n, d ∈ N.
Lemma 29 For random unitaries U j , V j , j = 1, . . . , n, α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and 0 < δ < 12 ,
it holds
Pr
 1dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
U j |i〉〈i|U j† ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉〈i+ β|V j+α† /∈
[
1− δ
d2
1 ,
1 + δ
d2
1
] ≤ 2d2 exp
(
− nδ
2
d2 ln 2
)
.
(146)
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Proof Let α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d} and 0 < δ < 12 . Then,
EUV
1
dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
U j |i〉〈i|U j† ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉〈i+ β|V j+α† (147)
= EUU |0〉〈0|U † ⊗ EUU |0〉〈0|U † = 1
d2
, (148)
so [27, Thm. 19] can be applied, yielding the desired property. uunionsq
Lemma 30 For all α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d} and 0 < δ < 12 , if n ≥ 6d and
1
dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
U j |i〉〈i|U j† ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉〈i+ β|V j+α† ∈
[
1− δ
d2
1 ,
1 + δ
d2
1
]
, (149)
then
Iacc
({
1
dn
, U j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB
})
≤ log dn− inf
|ϕ〉
H˜αβϕ,δ(U,V), (150)
where U = (U1, . . . , Un), V = (V 1, . . . , V n) and
H˜αβϕ,δ(U,V) =
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
η
(
d
n(1 + δ)
∣∣〈ϕ|EAEBU j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB ∣∣2) , (151)
with η(x) = −x log x.
Proof Let α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d} and 0 < δ < 12 . Without loss of generality, the optimisation in
Iacc can be restricted to rank 1 POVMs, hence
Iacc
({
1
dn
, U j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB
})
= sup
{µk|ϕk〉〈ϕk|} rank-1 POVM
I(ij : k) (152)
= log dn− inf
{µk|ϕk〉〈ϕk|}
∑
k
p(k)H
(
p(ij|k) : i = 1 . . . d, j = 1 . . . n)
(153)
≤ log dn− inf
|ϕk〉∈HEAEB
H
(
p(ij|k) : i = 1 . . . d, j = 1 . . . n), (154)
where
p(ijk) =
µk
dn
∣∣〈ϕk|U j |i〉 ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉∣∣2 , (155)
p(k) =
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
p(ijk) and p(ij|k) = p(ijk)
p(k)
. (156)
By assumption p(k) ∈
[
(1−δ)µk
d2
, (1+δ)µk
d2
]
, hence
p(ij|k) ≥ d
n(1 + δ)
∣∣〈ϕk|U j |i〉 ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉∣∣2 (157)
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and
p(ij|k) ≤ d
n(1− δ)
∣∣〈ϕk|U j |i〉 ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉∣∣2 ≤ 1
e
, (158)
for n ≥ 6d. As η(x) is increasing for x ≤ 1e ,
H
(
p(ij|k) : i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , n) ≥ d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
η
(
d
n(1 + δ)
∣∣〈ϕ|U j |i〉 ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉∣∣2) , (159)
finishing the proof. uunionsq
Next, we lower bound inf |ϕ〉 H˜
αβ
ϕ,δ(U,V) using the following concentration of measure result:
Theorem 31 (Theorem 2.4 in [28]) Let (X , g) be a compact connected smooth Riemannian manifold with
Ricci curvature ≥ Ricmin(X ) > 0 equipped with the normalised Riemannian volume element dµ = dvV .
Then for any λ-Lipschitz function F on X and any r ≥ 0,
µ ({F ≤ EF − r}) ≤ exp
(
−Ricmin(X )r
2
2λ2
)
. (160)
In order to apply Theorem 31 we need to lower bound the expectation value of H˜ .
Lemma 32 There exists d1, such that for d ≥ d1, n = d8, |ϕ〉 ∈ HEAEB , α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d}
and δ = 1log dn we have
EUVH˜αβϕ,δ(U,V) ≥ log dn−O(1), (161)
where we are using the Haar measure on SU(d)2n.
For the proof see Section . We also need the fact that SU(d)2n is a compact connected smooth Riemannian
manifold with positive Ricci curvature (for details see Section ). Next, we need to upper bound the Lipschitz
constant of H˜ with respect to the Riemannian metric of SU(d)2n.
Lemma 33 For every n > d ≥ 8, α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d}, 0 < δ < 12 and |ϕ〉 ∈ HEAEB , the
Lipschitz constant λ˜ of H˜αβϕ,δ is upper bounded
λ˜ ≤ 8d√
n
log n. (162)
The proof can be found in Section . Apart from applying Theorem 31 to H˜ , we will need the following net
result:
Lemma 34 (Lemma II.4 in [29]) For 0 < x < 1 there exists a set M of unit vectors in H with |M| ≤(
5
x
)2 dimH such that for every unit vector |ϕ〉 ∈ H there exists |ϕ˜〉 ∈ M with ‖|ϕ〉 − |ϕ˜〉‖2 ≤ x2 . Such an
M is called an “x-net“.
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Finally, we will need the Lipschitz constant of HˆUV : HEAEB → R, HˆUV(|ϕ〉) = H˜αβϕ,δ(U,V).
Lemma 35 For every U,V, n > d ≥ 8, α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d} and 0 < δ < 12 the Lipschitz
constant λˆ of HˆUV is upper bounded
λˆ ≤ 4
√
2d log n. (163)
For the proof see Section .
Proof of Proposition 28 Let 0 < r < 1, 0 < δ < 14 , d ≥ 8 and n = d8. By Lemma 34 there exists an
r
8
√
2d logn
-netM of pure states inHEAEB with |M| ≤
(
40
√
2d logn
r
)2d2
. We will first show that there exists
a d0 such that for d ≥ d0 there exist 2n unitaries U1, . . . , Un, V 1, . . . , V n fulfilling
(i) H˜αβϕ˜,δ(UV) ≥ EUVH˜αβϕ˜,δ − r4 ∀α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d}, |ϕ˜〉 ∈ M,
(ii) 1dn
∑d
i=1
∑n
j=1 U
j |i〉〈i|U j† ⊗ V j+α|i + β〉〈i + β|V j+α† ∈ [1−δ
d2
1 , 1+δ
d2
1
] ∀α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈
{1, . . . , d}.
Using Theorem 31, Lemma 29 and the union bound, we get
Pr {not (i) or not (ii)} ≤ nd |M| exp
(
− cdr
2
32λ˜2
)
+ 2nd3 exp
(
− nδ
2
2d ln 2
)
(164)
≤ 1
2
exp
((
ln 4d+
80
√
2d3
r
)
8 log d− cr
2d7
131072(log d)2
)
+
1
2
exp
(
ln 4 + 11 ln d− d
7δ2
2 ln 2
)
,
(165)
where it has been used that Ricmin(d) = cd (see Section ). Both exponents can be made negative for large
enough d0 and d ≥ d0, implying that Pr {not (i) or not (ii)} < 1; hence the desired unitaries exist. Now
we will show that this implies Proposition 28. By (ii) and Lemma 30,
Iacc
({
1
dn
, U j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB
})
≤ log dn− inf
|ϕ〉
H˜αβϕ,δ(U,V). (166)
By the definition of the infimum, there exists |ϕ0〉 ∈ HEAEB such that H˜αβϕ0,δ(U,V) < inf |ϕ〉 H˜
αβ
ϕ,δ(U,V) +
r
4 . By Lemma 34, |M| contains a state |ϕ˜0〉 such that ‖|ϕ0〉 − |ϕ˜0〉‖2 ≤ r16√2d logn . By Lemma 35 then,∣∣∣H˜αβϕ0,δ(U,V)− H˜αβϕ˜0,δ(U,V)∣∣∣ ≤ r4 . (167)
Consequently H˜αβϕ˜0,δ(U,V) ≤ H˜
αβ
ϕ0,δ
(U,V) + r4 < inf |ϕ〉 H˜
αβ
ϕ,δ(U,V) +
r
2 . Setting d ≥ max {d0, d1} and
δ = 1log dn , we obtain
Iacc
({
1
dn
, U j |i〉EA ⊗ V j+α|i+ β〉EB
})
< log dn− H˜αβϕ˜0,δ(U,V) +
r
2
(168)
≤ log dn− EU,VH˜αβϕ˜0,δ +
3r
4
(169)
≤ O(1), (170)
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where the second and third inequalities are due to (i) and Lemma 32, respectively. uunionsq
Technical Lemmas
We will now briefly review some facts about the Riemannian geometry of the special unitary group.
Lemma 36 SU(d), thought of as a sub-manifold in Cd×d, and equipped with the Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product on its tangent spaces, is a compact connected Riemannian manifold.
Proof It is known that SU(d) is a real semi-simple compact connected Lie group [30]. Every real Lie group
is a real smooth manifold. Clearly, the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product is a positive definite bilinear form.
It is also easy to see that it is smooth. Let U ∈ SU(d) and X,Y be some smooth vector fields on SU(d),
that is smooth mappings of SU(d) into its tangent bundle. As it is a composition of smooth maps, the map
U 7→ Tr (X(U)†, Y (U)) is smooth. Hence the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product on the tangent spaces is
what is referred to as a “Riemannian metric”. A smooth manifold endowed with a Riemannian metric is a
Riemannian manifold [31]. uunionsq
From [32], we know that there exists c > 0 such that
Ricmin(d) := inf Ric(x, x) = cd. (171)
The infimum is taken over all tangent unit vectors and Ric denotes the Ricci curvature.
Now we can define a Riemannian distance, which is a metric, for SU(d)
dSU(d)(U,U ′) = inf
γ:[0,1]→SU(d) s.t. γ(0)=U,γ(1)=U ′
∫ 1
0
∥∥γ′(t)∥∥
HS
dt. (172)
The Cartesian product SU(d)2n is a Riemannian manifold as well [28]. As for its metric, we have
Lemma 37 The Riemannian distance of a Cartesian productM×N of Riemannian manifolds is given by
the Pythagorean theorem
dM×N ((U, V ), (U˜ , V˜ )) =
√
dM(U, U˜)2 + dN (V, V˜ )2, (173)
for U, U˜ ∈M, V, V˜ ∈ N .
Proof We know that for tangent vectors x, y, ‖(x, y)‖2 = ‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2. We also need the fact that the
the length of a curve L(γ) =
∫ 1
0 ‖γ′(t)‖ dt is independent of the parametrisation, that is for an increasing
function τ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], it holds L(γ ◦ τ) = L(γ). Hence it is always possible to find a parametrisation
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such that ‖γ′(t)‖ is constant, so L(γ) = ‖γ′(t)‖. Consequently,
dM×N ((U, V ), (U˜ , V˜ )) = inf
γγ˜
∫ 1
0
√
‖γ′(t)‖2 + ‖γ˜′(t)‖2dt (174)
= inf
γγ˜
√
L(γ)2 + L(γ˜)2 (175)
=
√
dM(U, U˜)2 + dN (V, V˜ )2, (176)
which is what we wanted. uunionsq
The minimum Ricci curvature for a Cartesian product of manifolds is just the smallest curvature of the
factors. Hence Theorem 31 can be applied to H˜ .
Let us now present the proofs that were omitted in the previous section.
Proof of Lemma 32 Let d ≥ 2, n = d8, |ϕ〉 ∈ HEAEB , α ∈ {1, . . . , n} and β ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We need to
lower bound EH˜ . For a probability distribution {pi} it holds that H2(p) = − log
(∑
i p
2
i
) ≤ ∑i η(pi) =
H(p). Here, however, we have p˜ij = dn(1+δ)
∣∣〈ϕ|U j |i〉 ⊗ V j+α|1 + β〉∣∣2. Note that 0 ≤ p˜ij ≤ dn ≤ 1e .
The {p˜ij} are, in general, no probability distribution. However, Lemma 29 tells us that they are most likely
close to one. Namely, for 0 < δ < 14 ,
P
 d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
p˜ij /∈
[
1− δ
1 + δ
, 1
] ≤ 2d2 exp(− nδ2
d 2 ln 2
)
. (177)
In order to stop H2 from diverging, let us add a little perturbation that keeps p˜ij away from 0. Namely, we
define
pˆij = (1− )p˜ij +  1
dn
. (178)
By concavity and monotonicity of η on [0, 1e ],
η(pˆij) ≤ η((1− )p˜ij) + η
( 
nd
)
≤ η(p˜ij) + η
( 
nd
)
. (179)
Hence, choosing  = 1log dn , we obtain H(p˜) ≥ H(pˆ)−O(1). Next, let us note that if
∑
ij p˜ij ∈
[
1−δ
1+δ , 1
]
,
it also holds
∑
ij pˆij ∈
[
1−δ
1+δ , 1
]
. Let us call this event G. If G is true, by Jensen’s inequality,
H(pˆ) ≥
∑
ij
pˆijH2(pˆ)− η
∑
ij
pˆij
 ≥ 1− δ
1 + δ
H2(pˆ)− η
(
1− δ
1 + δ
)
. (180)
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Hence,
EUVH(p˜) ≥ EUVH(pˆ)−O(1) (181)
≥
∫
G
dUV H(pˆ)−O(1) (182)
≥ 1− δ
1 + δ
∫
G
dUV H2(pˆ)−O(1) (183)
=
1− δ
1 + δ
(
EUVH2(pˆ)−
∫
UV/∈G
dUV H2(pˆ)
)
−O(1) (184)
≥ 1− δ
1 + δ
(
EUVH2(pˆ)− 2d2 exp
(
− nδ
2
d 2 ln 2
)
log
dn
2
)
−O(1), (185)
so it is sufficient to lower bound the expectation value of H2(pˆ).
EUVH2(pˆ) ≥ − log
EUV∑
ij
pˆ2ij
 (186)
= − log (nd EUV pˆ200) (187)
= − log
(
nd
(
(1− )2EUV p˜200 +
2(1− )
nd
EUV p˜00 +
2
n2d2
))
, (188)
where
EUV p˜00 ≤ d
n
EUV Tr
(
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|U |0〉〈0|U † ⊗ V |0〉〈0|V †
)
(189)
=
d
n
Tr
(
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|(EUU |0〉〈0|U †)⊗2
)
(190)
=
1
nd
(191)
and, using a 2-design,
EUV p˜200 ≤
d2
n2
EUV Tr
(
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|U |0〉〈0|U † ⊗ V |0〉〈0|V †
)2
(192)
=
d2
n2
Tr
(
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|⊗2
(
(EUU |0〉〈0|U †)⊗2
)⊗2)
(193)
=
4
n2(d+ 1)2
Tr
(
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|⊗2EAEBΠ+EAEA ⊗Π+EBEB
)
(194)
≤ 4
n2d2
, (195)
where Π+ denotes the projector onto the symmetric subspace. Hence,
EUVH2(pˆ) ≥ log nd− log
(
4(1− )2 + 2(1− )+ 2) ≥ log nd− log 7. (196)
Choosing δ = 1log dn , for large enough d1 and d ≥ d1 we obtain
EUVH˜αβϕ,δ(U,V) = EUVH(p˜) ≥ log dn−O(1), (197)
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and we are done. uunionsq
Before proving Lemma 33, we need to upper bound the Lipschitz constant of the function H ′βδ :⊕n
j=1HEAEB → R,
H ′βδ(|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉) =
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
η
(
d
n(1 + δ)
Tr (|i〉〈i| ⊗ |i+ β〉〈i+ β||φj〉〈φj |)
)
. (198)
Note that for |φj〉 = U j† ⊗ V j+α†|ϕ〉,
H˜αβϕδ (UV) = H
′
βδ(U
1† ⊗ V 1+α†|ϕ〉, . . . , Un† ⊗ V n+α†|ϕ〉). (199)
Lemma 38 For all n > d ≥ 8, 0 < δ < 12 , β ∈ {1, . . . , d} the Lipschitz constant λ′ of H ′βδ is upper
bounded
λ′ ≤ 4
√
2d√
n
log n. (200)
Proof Let n > d ≥ 8, 0 < δ < 12 and β ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We will make use of the fact that λ′2 =
sup〈φj |φj〉≤1∀j ∇H ′βδ · ∇H ′βδ. Writing |φj〉 =
∑d
lm=1 φ
(j)
l,m|lm〉, we get
H ′βδ(|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉) =
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
η
(
d
n(1 + δ)
∣∣∣φ(j)i,i+β∣∣∣2) = d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
η
(
cr2ij
)
, (201)
where we have defined b = dn(1+δ) and rij =
∣∣∣φ(j)i,i+β∣∣∣. By assumption b < 1. Computing the gradient we
obtain
sup
〈φj |φj〉≤1∀j
∇H ′βδ · ∇H ′βδ = sup
〈φj |φj〉≤1∀j
4b
(ln 2)2
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
br2ij
(
ln (br2ij) + 1
)2 (202)
≤ sup∑d
i=1 r
2
ij≤1∀j
4b
(ln 2)2
 d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
br2ij
(
ln br2ij
)2
+ bn
 (203)
=
4bn
(ln 2)2
(
sup∑d
i=1 yi≤b, yi≥0∀i
d∑
i=1
yi(ln yi)
2 + b
)
(204)
Using Lagrange multipliers, it can be shown that for d ≥ 8 the maximum is attained at yi = bd , hence
λ′2 ≤ 4b
2n
(ln 2)2
((
ln
b
d
)2
+ 1
)
≤ 32d
2
n
(log n)2 , (205)
finishing the proof. uunionsq
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Proof of Lemma 33 Let U1, . . . , Un, V1, . . . , Vn, U ′1, . . . , U ′n, V ′1 , . . . , V ′n ∈ SU(d). Then
∣∣∣H˜αβϕδ (U,V)− H˜αβϕδ (U′,V′)∣∣∣ ≤ λ′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n⊕
j=1
(
U †j ⊗ V †j+α − U ′†j ⊗ V ′†j+α
)
|ϕ〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(206)
= λ′
√√√√ n∑
j=1
∥∥∥(U †j ⊗ V †j+α − U ′†j ⊗ V ′†j+α) |ϕ〉∥∥∥2
2
(207)
≤ λ′
√√√√ n∑
j=1
∥∥∥(U †j ⊗ V †j+α − U ′†j ⊗ V ′†j+α)∥∥∥2∞ (208)
≤
√
2λ′
√√√√ n∑
j=1
∥∥∥Uj − U ′j∥∥∥2∞ +
n∑
j=1
∥∥∥Vj − V ′j∥∥∥2∞. (209)
Since
dRiem(U,U
′) = inf
γ
∫ b
a
∥∥γ′(t)∥∥
HS
dt ≥ inf
γ
∥∥∥∥∫ b
a
γ′(t)dt
∥∥∥∥
HS
(210)
= inf
γ
‖γ(a)− γ(b)‖HS =
∥∥U − U ′∥∥
HS
≥ ∥∥U − U ′∥∥∞ , (211)
we get λ˜ =
√
2λ′. Applying Lemma 38 finishes the proof. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 35 Let U,V ∈ SU(d)d, α ∈ {1, . . . , n}, β ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Then for all |ϕ〉, |ϕ′〉 ∈ H,
∣∣∣HˆUV(|ϕ〉)− HˆUV(|ϕ′〉)∣∣∣ ≤ λ′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n⊕
j=1
U j ⊗ V j+α (|ϕ〉 − |ϕ′〉)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(212)
= λ′
√√√√ n∑
j=1
‖U j ⊗ V j+α (|ϕ〉 − |ϕ′〉)‖22 (213)
= λ′
√
n
∥∥|ϕ〉 − |ϕ′〉∥∥
2
, (214)
where we have used that the Hilbert space norm is unitarily invariant. uunionsq
47
Supplementary Note 6
Replacing distillable entanglement by (one-way) non-distillable entanglement
In contrast to the limitations on quantum key repeaters described in the earlier sections, this section
shows that in some cases the use of a large amount of distillable entanglement in the form of EPR states can
be replaced by one-way non-distillable states.
In order to see this, consider a situation in which Alice and Charlie share a private bit γAA′CAC′A , which
is almost PPT in the sense that EN (γ) ≤ . This implies that the shield dimension |C ′A| = d ' 1 : we write
γ in its X-form and calculate
EN (||γΓ||) = log(||
√
X†X
Γ||1 + ||XΓ||1) ≥ log(1 + ||XΓ||1) ' ||XΓ||1 (215)
which holds for small log negativity. d ' 1 now follows, since ||XΓ|| ≥ 1d for ||X||1 = 1 (the diamond
norm of the transpose map in dimension d equals d). Applying the standard quantum repeater protocol
based on teleportation would thus require Charlie and Bob to share 1 + log d EPR pairs.
Instead let now Charlie and Bob share only one EPR pair |φ〉〈φ|CBB and a copy of the Choi-Jamilkowski
state corresponding to the 50% erasure channel: ρC′BB′ =
1
2 |ψ〉〈ψ|+ 12 1d ⊗ |e〉〈e|, where |ψ〉 = 1√d
∑d
i |ii〉
and |e〉 is the erasure symbol orthogonal to {|i〉}. We emphasize that the one-way (from Charlie to Bob)
distillable key rate and hence also the corresponding rate of distillable entanglement vanish for this state as
it admits a symmetric extension.
Now let Charlie teleport system CA to Bob by use of the EPR pair and C ′A by using ρ instead of |ψ〉〈ψ|.
It is easy to verify that the resulting state has the form
σAA′BB′ =
1
2
γAA′BB′ +
1
2
γAA′B ⊗ |e〉〈e|, (216)
where γAA′B = TrB′γAA′BB′ . In order to compute a lower bound on the key rate of this state, we will
convert it into a cqq state: Consider a purification σAA′BB′E . Let Alice measure her key system in the
computational basis with outcome stored in register X and let both players remove (but keep in their labs)
the shield systems. The resulting state has the form
σXBE =
1
2
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)⊗ γE + 1
2
(|00〉〈00| ⊗ σ0,E + |11〉〈11| ⊗ σ1,E) (217)
for certain states γE , σ0,E , σ1,E of Eve. It is now easy to compute the lower bound on the one-way (from
Alice to Bob) key rate K→(σXBE) given by Devetak and Winter [15]: I(X : B)σ − I(X : E)σ ≥ 12 . In
conclusion, a constant key rate can be obtained with a single EPR pair and the (one-way) non-distillable
erasure channel.
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